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The violence and civil war that has devastated the
Republic of El Salvador since 1979 is presented by our govern
ment and by a large part of the press as a struggle between
Marxism and Democracy.

They have promoted the image of a

peaceful, mountain country victimized by Moscow-inspired
Communists intent on knocking down another domino on the
road from Havana to Managua to San Salvador and ultimately
to Mexico, Dallas and Washington.

Such interpretations have

a way of becoming self-fulfilling prophecies if we can learn
anything from the experience of Cuba and Nicaragua.

The

bitter political and economic realities of contemporary
Central America are deeply rooted in the past and have little
to do with the international forces that are now exploiting
the crises on the Isthmus.

The present conflicts are neither

recent in origin nor conducive to short-term military, eco
nomic or political solutions.

To be sure, the Soviets exploit

these conflicts, but they did not initiate them and their
withdrawal would not terminate them.

'

The present crises in

the Central American states all represent the inevitable
collapse of political, economic and cultural structures
erected in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
to serve the interests of the elites who commanded the Liberal
Reforms or Revolutions of that era ,but which now fail to
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meet the needs of the societies the y created.
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At the root of the present cris e s is an historic process
by which the traditional society of lords and peasants e v ol v ed
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into a more modern society, with small but significant middle
sectors demanding a share of the oligarchies' political and economic
preserves.

Conflict between a privileged elite on the one

hand and an oppressed peasantry on the other dates from the
Spanish Conquest.

Calculated terror has been an established

method of control of the rural population for five centuries.
Resentful peasants have often responded violently, and sometimes touched off widespread revolution and civil war.

This

first took place in Guatemala and Nicaragua between 1525 and
1550, but these confrontations became more frequent as greater
demands were made upon the peasantry and their lands, and as
they developed some awareness of the possibility of improving
their condition, or at the very least of preserving what
little they had.

In broad historic terms, El Salvador and

the rest of Central America are still involved in a classic
struggle to replace the vestiges of Spanish feudalism with
capitalism.

The failure to mitigate some of the harsher eco

nomic and social consequences of this shift have encouraged
the rise of Marxist and other modern anti-capitalist forces.
Unified under Spain for nearly 300 years as the "Kingdom
of Guatemala," Central America achieved its independence in
1821 and, after 18 months as part of a Mexican Empire, es
tablished a republican federation optimistically called the
''United Provinces of the Center of America."
experiment need not delay us here.

That tragic

By 1840 the federation
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had disintegrated and the five present-day city states were
going their separate ways.

The two political parties,
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however, that formed around the ideological issues of the
first decades of independence provided the structure for the
political activities of the socio-economic elites in each
of the Central American states and underscored a degree of
continuity among members of the elites in all five states.
These parties--Conservative and Liberal--were factions of a
landholding and bureaucratic elite, but they reflected funda
mentally different perceptions on how best to develop their
country.
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Conservatives looked toward maintenance of the two
class society that had so long characterized both Spain and
Central America.

They favored policies that would preserve

the aristocratic landholding elites in their traditional,
dominant roles, but also, in noblesse oblige fashion, assured
the peasants of a degree of protection, especially against
exploitation by the Liberal modernizers.

Overcoming initial

Liberal gains at the outset of independence, these Conserva
tives and their caudillos controlled most of Central America
in the mid-nineteenth century.

They emphasized traditional

Hispanic values and institutions, especially the Roman
Catholic Church, and rewarded loyal I ndian and mestizo
peasants with paternalism and respect for their communal lands.
Their demands on the peasants were real, but limited, and
subsistence agriculture continued to be the principal ac
tivity of most.

They relied on the Church and local caudillos

and landowners--in feudal st y le--for social control and to
guarantee peace and securit y .

The y thus defended states'
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rights against national unity and were xenophobic toward
foreigners who threatened the traditional society with Protes
tantism, democracy and modernization.

While they welcomed

some expansion of agricultural exports, which allowed them
a few luxury imports, they were sensitive to the danger of
upsetting native labor and land tenure patterns, and they were
essentially opposed to granting the nation's land and resources
to foreign capitalists who generally did not share their re
ligion, language or social and cultural values, or who might
threaten the preeminent place that they held in the social
.

structure o f t h e provinces.
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Peasant insurgency in the 1830s,

sometimes instigated by small hacendados, in Guatemala, Hon
duras and El Salvador, against Liberal innovators, had been
instrumental in the Conservative accession to power.
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Liberals, on the other hand, represented that segment
of the landholding elite and an incipient bourgeoisie that
wished to modernize Central America through emulation of the
economic and political success of western Europe and the
United States from the late eighteenth century forward.
These "modernizers'' rejected traditional Hispanic values and
institutions, especially the Church, and espoused classical
economic liberalism, opposing monopolies while encouraging
private foreign trade, immigration and investment.

They

emphasized exports, and treated the rural masses and their
lands as the principal resources to be exploited in this
effort.

Although republican and democratic in political

theory, they became much influenced by positivist materialism
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later in the century, and were contemptuous, even embarrassed,
by the Indian heritage of their countries.
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Once in power

they resorted to dictatorship to accomplish their economic
goals and to defend their gains.

Thus the professionalization

of the military, which became their power base, was a constant
trend in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The Liberals wished to modernize their countries in imitation
of the United States and western Europe, but the absence of
stronger middle sectors in the traditional two-class Central
American society and the persistence of elitist attitudes
toward the masses meant that in practice that development
proceeded very differently than in the industrialized nations.
What emerged were elite oligarchies 9f planters and capitalists
who cynically and without the noblesse oblige of their Conservative predecessors, continued to live off the labor of
an oppressed rural population which shared little if any of
the benefits of the expanded export production.

On the

contrary, they found their own subsistence threatened by
5

encroachment on their lands for the production of export crops.
El Salvador was at the heart of many of the frequent
clashes between Conservatives and Liberals in the early
independent years.

A part of the province of Guatemala

throughout most of the colonial period, El Salvador began to
emerge as a separate jurisdiction in the eighteenth century
when it became the principal idigo-producing region of the
Kingdom, responsible for the majority of Guatemalan exports.
Its separate political status was recognized with the
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establishment of an intendency at San Salvador in 1786 and the
economic growth of the region made it rival the new capital
of Guatemala, established after the destruction of Antigua
Guatemala by a devastating earthquake in 1773.

Even then,

Salvadorans had the reputation for being economically the
most aggressive of all Central Americans.

In the early days

of independence they struggled against Guatemalan dominance
for their independence, a struggle symbolized by their demand
for an establishement of a separate doicese with their own
bishop, in order to escape the ecclesiastical control 0f the
ultra-conservative hierarchy in Guatemala.

Thus San Salvador

became the center of liberalism against the Conservative
citadel of Guatemala during the first half-century of inde
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pendence.
Liberal triumph in every state after 1870 was accompanied
b y a boom in coffee exports, with urbanization, railway
construction and significant economic growth under Liberal
guidance.

The "coffee prosperity'' assured not only Liberal

political dominance (enforced by a strong military establish
ment), but the emergence of a new ''coffee elite" and an allied
urban national bourgeoisie in these ''liberal states,"
especially in Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica. 6
Liberal dominance was absolute in Guatemala and El Salvador
until 1944.

Under the

Liberals, then~ powerful, export

oriented elites exploited the labor of the rural masses in
collaboration with foreign capital, management and markets.
The old Conservative parties disappeared, while in realit y ,
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of course, the Liberals became the conservatives of the
twentieth century.
A salient characteristic in the rise of these oligarchies
was their ever-closer relationship with North American capital
and the US government.

The development model during the past

century which Central Americans have most sought to duplicate
--to imitate--is the North American experience.

It has been

a model which has stimulated significant modernization in
Central America, yet which has failed to fulfill the promises
of prosperity and general welfare which its promoters expected.
Instead, new levels of poverty and misery have come to be
associated with the development process, and instead of
''developing nations," these states have become dependent poor
relations of an industrialized core of North Atlantic mother
I

countries.
The charge of "dollar diplomacy'' found easy documentation
in Central America from the 1860s forward.

A close relation

ship between the Liberal Parties and the United States evolved
between 1870 and 1945 in the economic, social, political and
cultural spheres.

Even as early as the 1840s, US diplomats

had favored the Liberals in contrast to Britain's courting
of the Conservatives.

The Anglo-American rivalry by 1914

was decided clearly in the US favor.

The United States be

came the principal market for Central American exports,
especially bananas, which developed with US capital, shipping
and technology.

US industrial and agricultural exports

flooded the Central American markets, often destroying
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native handicraft industries.

North American manufacturing

and construction companies supplied the material and technology
for modernization of Central America's city-state capitals.
The International Railway of Central America and Tropical
Radio, both subsidiaries of the giant United Fruit Company,
monopolized transportation and communications throughout
the Isthmus and overcame, greatly aided by World War I,
German and British competition, completing US hegemony over
Central America.
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The elite sent their children to school in the United
States, and they often returned with spouses who brought
North American values directly into the social structure of
the Isthmus, blending more modern attitudes with traditional
Hispanic values. 8

This became noticeable even among the

emerging middle class.

The Liberals imitated US political

forms if not realities, and the terminology of North American
democracy filled the Liberal rhetoric.

They rewrote the

Central American constitutions to conform more closely to the
US Constitution of 1789, although in practice Central American
chiefs-of-state retained far more authority than in the
United States.

North American politicians, businessmen and

academics of the era pointed to the enthusiasm with which
Central Americans were adapting to the US model.

Without

actually hoisting the stars and stripes, Central America
became a US colonial dominion.

US embassies became in

ordinately large for such tiny countries, and basic economic
and political decisions for these states were often made
within our embassy walls.

Major US military interventions

•
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occurred only in Nicaragua and Panama, but military missions
provided significant assistance toward the maintenance of the
Liberal dictatorships through the training of national police
forces to maintain internal security.
El Salvador followed this pattern closely.

Its military

dictatorships were less blatant in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries than in some of the other Central
American states, and its oligarchy appeared to encourage
some democratic practice along with important expansion of
economic opportunity for the middle class.

More than in

other Central American states, the effects of the Liberal
revolution was seen to expand prosperity, building the

.

infrastructure of paved roads and ports, expanding education
for the middle class and converting San Salvador into a

I

modern city.

In reality, however, the coffee elite discreetly
/

monopolized the power, with the Melendez family getting the
largest share.

The oligarchy called the shots, passing

around the presidency and the principal ministries among
themselves.
elections.

No opposition party was allowed to win national
More and more land was put into coffee and other

export crops at the expense of food production.

Especially

in El Salvador, as the population increased because of
eradication of epidemic diseases, the lot of the rural peasant
deteriorated steadily, so that the Salvadoran peasant became

,.

one of the most oppressed and poorly fed in the world.

9

Some North Americans are shocked to learn that capitalist
"modernization" over the past century has actually meant

10
a lowered standard of living for most Central Americans.
Central American travel accounts of the nineteenth century,
however, reflect significantly better living conditions than
those found today among most rural Central Americans.

Most

had land upon which to grow food, and fresh fruits, vegetables,

.

grains, meat and poultry were generally abundant and inex
pensive.

The wife of a British diplomat observed in 1869

that most of the rural peasants had their own land and house.
"The cottages of the poor people," she noted,"were remarkably
neat and clean, each surrounded by its own beautiful shrubbery
of fruit trees."

She and many other foreign travellers also

commented on the relatively modest life-style of the elite and
their direct involvement in the labors of their businesses
or estates. 10

The distinctions between rich and poor were

less marked than today.

Debt peonage was not widespread in

most of the region before 1870 and was much less prevalent
.
.
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tan
in Mexico.
h

By the 1970s malnutrition was widespread,

and El Salvador compared with Bangladesh as among the most
poorly nourished and land poor countries in the world.

12

While many Americans are compassionate regarding the poverty
and misery in El Salvador, they become defensive when the
suggestion is made that it has been caused by North American
capital development in that country.

While it is true that

this was done in collaboration with the native elite, the
foreign capitalists have been active if sometimes naive
partners in brutally keeping Salvadoran wages lower, sup
pressing labor unions and generally working against

•
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participation in government by the working masses.

The

paradoxical trend of greater economic development being
accompanied by greater poverty accelerated rapidly after
World War II, with the Alliance for Progress, the Common
Market and industrialization of San Salvador. 13
Serious challenges to the Liberal regimes in Central
America began during the 1920s, and after the Great Depression
the elite turned to stronger dictators to silence the middle
and working classes.

Ubico in Guatemala (1931-44), Hern~ndez

Martinez in Salvador (1931-44), and Somoza in Nicaragua
(1934-56) were the classic Liberal dictators of the 1930s,
symbols of order, stability and protection of American
interests in an otherwise troubled world.

Somoza directed

the assassination of the popular Augusto Sandino, who had
led the successful resistance to US occupation of Nicaragua,

,,

and Hernandez's troops massacred as many as 30,000 peasants
in a "communist" uprising in El Salvador.

Along with Carias

in Honduras (1933-49) they built fascist-like regimes on the
oligarchies' fear of "communism" and labor action generall y .
Only Costa Rica departed from this pattern significantl y .
The beginning of the end of the Liberal era had begun,
however.

Liberal economic programs and the foreign trade it

promoted engendered significant urban middle classes.

While

the elite controlled and oppressed the rural masses on their
estates, the urban population became more prosperous and
better educated, consistent with Liberal modernization
promises.

But these middle classes also demanded a great e r

14
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share of the economic product and participation in the politi
cal process.

The oligarchies begrudgingly made minor con

cessions, but jealously preserved most of the real economic
and political power to themselves, thus preventing the sort

.

of evolution toward social democracy that occurred in the
United States and western Europe.

Enrique Baloyra has recently

pointed out that this "reactionary despotism" of Central
American elites was based not on ignorance.

They were well

educated, but perceived the situation in selfish terms.
"Their historical opposition to political liberalization stems
from a keen awareness of the costs and benefits of reform,"
writes Baloyra.

"Their intransigent preference for nine-

teenth-century economic liberalism is rooted in this under
standing, and both help to nourish their basically reactionary
political stance."
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Several institutions, however, served the interests of
the new urban middle sectors.

The military itself was one

of these, providing a means of social mobility and access to
power from the lower echelons of society.

Repeatedly, ele

ments of the military have demanded reform and attention to
the economic concerns of the middle sectors. 16
More important, especially in El Salvador, have been two
elements less well connected to the oligarchies, more clearly
institutions of the new middle classes created by modernization.
As has already been suggested, the children of the elite
frequently were educated abroad, especially in the United
States, but the growing demand for skills in the modernizing

.,
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cities demanded the expansion of Central American universities
and these became a major avenue for middle-class mobility and
entrance into the political arena.

Irideed, . development of

higher education outside the control of the Church was a
major point in nineteenth-century Liberal policy.

Thus, from

the 1920s forward, students, professors and other intellectuals
began to form political parties and to establish a dialogue
of issues distinctly outside the old Liberal-Conservative
framework.

Professionals trained in Central American univer

sities played leading roles in these new parties, which re
flected philosophical and political currents of the twentieth
century, of Europe and later the "third world", rather than
the nineteenth-century Liberal, US orientation of the elite.
Marxism found favor with many, for it offered ''scientific"
explanations for their limited economic gains and their
dependent exploitation by capitalism.

But more moderate views

were also prevalent, developing into the so-called "democratic
left," best represented eventually in Christian Democracy
and Social Democracy.

All of these new forces had in common

that they were asking very different questions from those
which their Liberal predecessors had posed.

Although these

students and intellectuals were only a tiny minority of the
population, they provided articulation and leadership for
the middle and working classes.

Their alienation from the

Liberal establishment that created them is one of the major
.
17
k eys t o the present crises.
Alberto Masferrer, with his doctrine of

vitalismo, l e d

Salvadoran intellectuals in attacking militarism and

14
championing the cause of labor.

An advocate of broad social

reform, but rejecting Marxist "class struggle" analysis,
Masferrer nonetheless appeared ''redder than Trotsky" to the
Salvadoran elite of the 1930s.

He led the Salvadoran intel

lectual attack on the old order and is still revered among
opponents of Salvador's repressive right-wing government.
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There was a natural link, therefore, between the univer
sity communities and the emergence of organized labor, often
under-estimated in Central America because of labor's relati v e
weakness in comparison with its position in more industrialized
countries.

Late in organizing, owing to the small industrial

population and the anti-labor policies of the governments,
serious labor organization began in the 1920s.

Teachers'

unions were often in the vanguard of the labor movement.

.

Although suppressed ruthlessl y as "Communist" by the dicta
tors of the 1930s, organized labor played a role in their
overthrow and an even larger role in the emerging parties
after 1945.

The majority of Central American workers were

rural, but it has been the organization of urban workers
that has been most important in making labor a political
force in Central America, and the new political parties have
.
d th.
recognize
i s . 19

More recently, the Church has once more become a vocal
advocate of Central America's oppressed peoples.

The strong

l y anti-clerical Liberals allowed the Church to survi v e onl y
in a depressed, subservient condition, and after 1870 it was
largely excluded from education, government and economic
.)
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activity, areas where it had been of major importance before
about 1870.

What remained was a servile clergy that supported

the authority of the Liberal state.

Regular orders had nearly

all been expelled from Central America, but in the mid to
late twentieth century, in the name of religious toleration
and in response to international pressure, some were allowed
to return.

Foreigners often dominated these orders and some

of them, like the Maryknollers and Jesuits, began to emphasize
the Church's traditional concern for the masses.

By the

1970s a great movement, called "liberation theology,'' which
emphasized the social gospel and both lay and clergy responsi
bility to the poor had arisen.

The effects have been notable,

but have divided the Church in every Central American state.
Radical liberation theology combines Marxism and Christianity,
but more moderate clergy, especially after the Episcopal
conference at Medellin in 1968, also joined in condemning
government disregard for human rights.

In El Salvador the

movement was especially strong and extended to the ranks of
the hierarchy itself, Archbishop Oscar Romero calling for
more attention to the poor and criticizing the repeated
.
.
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violations
o f h uman rig
The challenge to the elite employed both revolutionary
violence and new political parties.

More modern parties

emerged first in Costa Rica, where the elitist parties
(Liberal and Conservative) were never so firmly entrenched as
in the other states.

21

In Guatemala a middle-class oriented revolution ended

16
the Ubico regime in 1944.

/

Philosopher-President Juan Jose

/

Arevalo launched a sweeping social revolution the following
year, incorporating many features of the Mexican Revolution,
1

and encouraging the rise of labor unions in the political and
economic life of the country.

His successor, Jacobo Arbenz,

carried the revolution further to the left, inaugurating a
major land reform program that challenged the United Fruit
Company hegemony, and led to a U.S-supported overthrow of the
Revolution by Guatemalan nee-Liberals headed by Miguel Ydigoras
and Carlos Castillo-Armas.

Guatemala has been under right-

.
.
22
wing
contro l ever since.
In El Salvador the story is less complex but similar.
Students, workers and progressive military officers overthrew
/

Hernandez Martinez in 1944 and formed the basis of more
effective middle class participation in politics.

In El

Salvador, however, the compact coffee oligarchy--the so-called
''14 families"--managed to keep control, and through the military
they were able to prevent their state from pursuing the re
formist route of either Costa Rica or Guatemala.

The Sal

vadoran elite had reacted savagely to ''save the country from
communism" in the 1932 peasant uprising and killed an estimated
10,000 to 30,000 peasants.

23

Yet labor and student organizations advanced, so that
they have become important forces in Salvadoran politics since
1945.

San Salvador industrialized notably as a result of the

Common Market.

This both expanded the urban middle and working

classes and widened the oligarchy, recently counted at 254

17
families, who maintained power throughout the period through
the Party of National Conciliation (PCN).

,

/

Jose Napoleon

Duarte led the Christian Democratic Party to challenge
seriously the ruling clique, and won the mayorship of San
Salvador, 1964-70.

Organization of peasants by the Christian

Democrats, the growing role of the Church on the side of
reform, pressures brought on by the 1969 "soccer war'' with
Honduras, and polarization of political issues all placed
great strain on the outmoded political ideology of the ruling
elite.

The showdown came in 1972 when Duarte won the presi

dential election but was denied office.

24

Factions of the oligarchy now turned to military terror

•

squads, as in Guatemala.

Here was the place for the United

States to play a role on behalf of orderly political process and
emergence of more modern--and moderate--political and social
forces.

Instead, the Nixon government continued our support

for the elite-backed PCN military regime, and we therefore
find ourselves in today's crisis.

The revolutionary junta

that took power in October 1979, with subsequent reshufflings
that eventually included Duarte as the chief-of-state,
represented more centrist, but relatively impotent elements
of the middle class after the conflict had already become
polarized.

Larqe numbers of the politically active, including

many Christian Democrats, had joined the guerrillas and their

•

political organizations as the only means of dealing with a
government that refused to recognize legitimate elections .

•

Denying gradual reform and change as the Christian Democrats

18
had advocated, a bloodbath enveloped the country, where more
than 45,000 people have died, mostly at the hands of the
government or its terrorists.

Comparing this as a percentage

of the population with the United States, it would be equiva
lent to nearly two million people dying in revolution here.
And more than a half million Salvadorans have fled the country,
equivalent to some 28 million in the US in terms of a per
centage of its total population.
Moderates could not control the right wing military, and
when the reformist Col. Adolfo Majano was forced out of
military command at the end of 1980, coinciding with the
election of the Reagan government in Washington, Duarte simply
became a captive of the old order, still believing he could
do more within the government than outside.

But he was in

effectual in stemming the atrocities of the military or in
bringing peace.

His agrarian reform was a step in the right

direction but it could not undo overnight the inequitites of
hundreds of years nor was it capable of bringing about the
necessary expansion of the economy to solve the severe eco
nomy and social problems of the country.

25

His defeat in the

1982 elections ended that phase of the conflict with the
election, under highly questionable circumstances, of a
reactionary coalition headed by Roberto d'Aubisson.

While

the February 1982 election reflected widespread exhaustion
with the civil war, it also reflected consolidation of neo
liberal forces to terminate the moderate coup of 1979.

The

new provisional president, Alvaro Magana, although moderate

1

19
in some respects, is dependent on this right-wing coalition.
so the war goes on in El Salvador, with heavy US military
aid to the government.

26

Contemporary El Salvador reflects the persistence of
nineteenth-century Liberalism, conservative by today's defi
nitions, among Central American elites, along with the
inevitable rise of more modern, middle class elements against
it.

While certain segments of the middle class have embraced

nee-liberalism, others, along with working class representa
tives, have risen to challenge it, with the inevitable clashes
of working class versus capitalist interests becoming important
in Central American politics.

The principal failure of

Liberalism and capitalism in Central America has been their

'

failure to reward labor with adequate wages so that the pros
perity could become more general and expand in a healthy
manner.

Especially in agriculture, but also in the capital

intensive new industries promoted by the Common Market, labor
has failed to receive a fair share of the gains, and this has
retarded development of a stronger consumer-based economy.
This continued repression of labor has deprived most Central
Americans of better standards of living and a more participatory
role in their governments.

The close relationship of the

United States to the old elites has been a major force in
allowing the repressive policies to continue as long as
they have.

'

•

Not until the Carter administration was there official
recognition that this relationship could be permanently

20
damaging to US interests in the region, as the inevitability
of change would sooner or later leave the US on the losing
side.

This is the lesson of Cuba, and of Nicaragua, El

Salvador, and Guatemala.

Whether moderate forces--as the

Christian Democrats or Social Democrats, seeking a synthesis
of socialism and capitalism into mixed economic and social
orders--will prevail in Central America will undoubtedly
depend to some degree on the willingness of United States
private and government interests to break with archaic politi
cal forces and strongly support more progressive but potentially
friendly elements such as the anti-Communist Christian Democrats,
Social Democrats or Socialists.

The alternative will almost

certainly be more violence, more radical Marxist strength,
and potential loss of our hegemony in the region to the
Soviet Union.

I can only note here the contrast with US

policy in Panama under Jimmy Carter, where returning the
Canal Zone to Panama in a statesmanlike fashion resulted in
a sounder relationship with the government and people of
Panama.
Great nations often decline when they become enchanted
with their own past to the degree that they lose sight of
the future.

This is the danger that the United States faces

ir1 its adulation of neo-Liberalism to the exclusion of twentieth
century social democracy.

The Central American crises are

direct challenges to our continued insistence on social and
economic solutions of the past.

We can support social

democracy now and endorse the principal of the greatest good

l
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for the greatest number, or watch the rest of the world
leave us behind with our vision of the world as it was.

'

•

NOTES
1.

Since 1970 a number of excellent books have presented de
tailed data and analyses of various aspects of contemporary
Central America. Among them, John Bell's Crisis in Costa
Rica: the 1948 Revolution (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1971); Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty
(Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis, 1977); Charles Amerinqer's Don
Pepe:~ Political Biography of JoseFigueres of Costa
Rica (Albuqerque: University of New Nexico Press, 1978);
Kenneth Grieb, Guatemalan Caudillo, the Regime of Jorge
Ubico, 1931-1944 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979);
Stephen Webre, Jose Napole6n Duarte and the Christian
Democratic Party in Salvadoran Politics, 1960-1972 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979); Jos.! Aybar,
Dependency and Intervention: The Case of Guatemala in
1954 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1979); Marvin Gettleman,
et al, El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War
(New York: Grove, 1981); Richard Immerman, The CIA i n
Guatemala (Austin: University of Texas Pres~l982);Enrique
Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1982); Tommie Sue Montgomery,
Revolution in El Salvador (Boulder, Colorado: Westview,
1982); JohnBooth, The End and the Beginning (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview, 1982); Stanford Central America Action
Network, Revolution in Central America (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview, 1983); andBarry B. Levine, ed., The New Cuban
Presence in the Caribbean (Boulder, Colorado: Westview,
1983), especially have added to our enlightenment regarding
the history of mid-twentieth-century Central America, but
all suffer from varying degrees of myopia regarding longer
historical patterns. Thomas P. Anderson's Matanza, El
Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932 (Lincoln, Neb.:
University
of Nebraska Press, 1971) andRichard N. Adams' Crucifixion
2.¥ Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure,
1944-1966 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970) offer,
at least superficially, a better understanding of the
relation events of the mid-twentieth century and those
of the nineteenth, but only David Brewing's El Salvador,
Landscape and Society (Oxford: Clarendon [Oxford University
Press], 1971), an historical geography, provides the sort
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